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ABSTRACT
The rise of software and software licensing has led to another
phenomenon: the attempted enforcement of software licenses
through copyright law. Over the last fifteen years, content creators
have begun to bring copyright suits against licensees, arguing that
violation of license terms withdraws the permission needed to run
the software, turning the use of the software into copyright
infringement. Not surprisingly, courts have rejected this argument,
and both the Ninth Circuit, in MDY v. Blizzard, and the Second
Circuit, in Krause v. Titleserv, have developed new legal rules to
prevent copyright enforcement of contract terms. This iBrief
explores software licensing in detail, analyzes the courts’
responses, and concludes that the Ninth Circuit’s approach to
copyright enforcement of license terms is preferable to the Second
Circuit’s approach because it is supported by legislative history,
more straightforward, and more likely to prevent future content
creators from enforcing their licenses through contract.

INTRODUCTION
In February 2007, Blizzard, the owner of a popular on-line game
called World of Warcraft (WoW), sued MDY Industries for contributory
and vicarious copyright infringement.2 Unlike defendants of other
secondary copyright suits, MDY was involved in neither peer-to-peer
distribution nor the production of unauthorized Blizzard content. Instead,
Blizzard sued MDY for producing Glider, a program that automatically
played the early levels of WoW for purchasing players and was therefore
considered cheating by Blizzard.3
¶1

1

J.D. candidate, 2012, Duke University School of Law. B.A., 2009, University
of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Professor Jenkins for all her advice and
guidance throughout the process of writing this piece.
2
MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2010).
Blizzard’s suit was actually a counterclaim; MDY originally sued for a
declaration that Glider did not infringe Blizzard’s copyrights. Id.
3
Id. at 935–36.

2011

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 007

How did the use of Glider violate Blizzard’s copyright? Blizzard
argued that it violated WoW’s software license,4 which prohibited cheating.
As a result, users of Glider no longer had Blizzard’s permission to make
copies of WoW’s software and code. Because WoW, like most computer
programs, creates copies of itself in the user’s computer when it runs,5
Blizzard’s withdrawal of permission turned the mere use of WoW into a
copyright violation. In sum, Blizzard argued that the violation of a contract
term about gaming behavior (namely, cheating), with no relation to
copyright, created a copyright violation because software copies itself when
it runs.
¶2

Blizzard was not the first plaintiff to make this argument. In
Krause v. Titleserv, a disgruntled ex-employee contractually prohibited his
employer from making any changes to his software.6 The employer
eventually did make small changes along with copies necessary to run the
programs.7 The ex-employee then sued his old employer for copyright
violations due to the employer’s copying and modifications.8
¶3

Courts have responded to prevent rightsholders from enforcing their
non-copyright license terms through copyright. The Second Circuit did so
by “sensibly consider[ing] [a licensee] the owner” of his software copies,
bringing his creation of incidental copies within the safe harbor of 17
U.S.C. § 117(a).9 The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, categorized the
same individuals as licensees,10 but limited copyright enforcement to where
there is a nexus between contract terms and copyright.11
¶4

The issue of whether, and to what extent, copyright holders should
be allowed to sue under copyright law due to license violations is not likely
to remain rare. This problem will only expand as software use and licensing
continue to develop, and it is important to analyze and understand the two
circuits’ approaches. Overall, the Ninth Circuit’s test is vastly preferable
¶5

4

In general, a license is less than full ownership and grants “[a] permission . . .
to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful.” License Definition,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). The kinds of permissions and types
of licenses can vary widely. See id.
5
MDY Indus., LLC, 629 F.3d at 938. This automatic play is “cheating” both
because it allows purchasing players to advance without having to put time into
the game and because players using Glider disrupt real players’ play. Id. at 935–
36.
6
Krause v. Titleserv, 402 F.3d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 2005).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 124.
10
See infra ¶311.
11
MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 941 (9th Cir. 2010).
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because it is more supported by the legislature, is clearer, and it better
prevents copyright holders from enforcing their licenses through contract.

I. SOFTWARE LICENSING
Before examining the Ninth and Second Circuits’ tests in more
detail, it is important to develop a preliminary understanding of software
licenses—how they work, why and how they are used, how they are limited,
and what future problems may arise from their use.
¶6

A. How Licensors Try To Enforce Their Non-Copyright License
Terms Through Copyright
Two unique features of software, one functional and one legal,
create the potential for rightsholders to enforce their licenses through
copyright law. Functionally, running software creates a temporary copy of
the program in the computer’s random access memory (RAM).12 When the
program is closed or the computer is shut down, the RAM is emptied and
the temporary copy is deleted.13 Software is unique because it requires the
creation of copies to be meaningfully used.14
¶7

This creation of copies, even temporary ones, implicates copyright
law and interacts with the second unique feature of software. Unlike for
other copyrighted works, a software licensee needs permission to access his
copy of the program. This feature is the result of legislative and judicial
action.
¶8

First, Congress only protected the owners of a copy of software
from copyright infringement liability from copies made as “essential step in
the utilization of the computer program.”15 As a result, a licensee of a copy
of software could theoretically violate copyright simply by running a
program if, for any reason, the use fell outside the permissions of the
license.
¶9

Second, courts turned this theory of copyright violation into reality
by finding that temporary RAM copies fit within the definition of copies
¶10

12

Jeff Tyson, How Computer Memory Works, COMPUTER MEMORY BASICS,
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/computer-memory1.htm (last visited Mar.
10, 2011).
13
Id.
14
See Christian H. Nadan, Software Licensing In The 21st Century: Are
Software “Licenses” Really Sales, And How Will The Software Industry
Respond?, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 555, 562 (2004) (“[T]o use software is to make a copy
of it.”).
15
17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006).
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under 17 U.S.C. § 101.16 Owners of a copyrighted program were protected
from this holding under § 117(a), but licensees of a copyrighted program
could be sued under copyright law for breaching a license term. Breach of
the license terms withdraws the copyright holder’s permission to create
copies and turns the use of the software into a copyright violation.

B. Why Copyright Holders Try To Use Copyright To Enforce Their
Licenses
Copyright holders prefer to enforce their licenses through copyright
for three primary reasons. First, copyright damages tend to be higher than
contract damages. Contract damages are “generally limited to the value of
the actual loss caused by the breach,”17 which is often negligible. Copyright
violations, however, could include statutory damages up to $150,000,
regardless of actual damages.18
¶11

Second, copyright remedies have broader reach. Contract claims
are limited to the parties of the contract. Copyright is not so limited, and
reaches any party that violates the plaintiff’s copyright.19
¶12

Third, and most significantly, copyright law provides for a variety
of remedies. Contract claims are limited to monetary damages and,
occasionally, specific performance.20 Copyright allows “injunctive relief,
seizure of infringing articles, and awards of costs and attorneys’ fees,”
giving content owners effective means to deter and stop breaching actors.21
¶13

C. How Copyright Holders Use Licenses
Copyright holders generally use licenses in three broad ways. First,
they use them to establish contract terms that mimic copyright protections,
such as a prohibition against unauthorized copying.22 This practice may be
a holdover from the early days of software, when it was unclear whether
software was eligible for copyright protection.23 Alternatively, content
¶14

16

See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir.
1993) (finding that RAM copies implicated copyright).
17
MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 941 n.3 (9th Cir.
2010).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 93 (4th
ed. 2007).
21
MDY Indus., LLC, 629 F.3d at 941 n.3.
22
Maureen A. O’Rourke, Drawing The Boundary Between Copyright And
Contract: Copyright Preemption Of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479,
490 (1995).
23
See id. at 488–489 (“[I]n the earliest days of software distribution, it simply
was not clear that software was protected by copyright law. Thus, software
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holders may be using these terms to put users on notice regarding the
copyright protection of their works.24 Regardless, because the licenses
merely duplicate copyright, there is little problem if the rightsholder uses
copyright to enforce his contract.
Second, copyright holders use licenses to protect their business
interests. Licenses can forbid actions that would devalue the copyright
holder’s business (such as cheating in an on-line game25) and, at the same
time, would allow the copyright holder to gain valuable information about
the consumer,26 ensure compatibility,27 and limit liability.28 In these
situations, the license terms have nothing to do with copyright and,
therefore, copyright enforcement is problematic.
¶15

Third, copyright holders use licenses to prohibit certain acts
explicitly allowed by the Copyright Act,29 such as reverse engineering.30
Although this is also done to protect business interests—to inhibit
competition—this third use is distinguishable from the second in that it falls
within fair use, a specific positive exception of the Copyright Act.31 Such
license terms are especially problematic, and they touch upon other issues,
such as preemption, that go beyond the scope of this paper.32
¶16

D. Limitations to Software Licenses Terms
Even before Krause and MDY, rightsholders were limited in their
ability to enforce software licenses through copyright by counterclaims or
¶17

providers perceived a need for contracts to serve as a type of ‘private legislation’
of copyright-type rights in the absence of certainty that copyright protection
extended to this new subject matter.” (citations omitted)).
24
Id. at 490.
25
E.g., World of Warcraft Terms of Use, BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT,
http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/wow_tou.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2011).
26
E.g., MICROSOFT SOFTWARE LICENSE TERMS, MICROSOFT OFFICE 2010
DESKTOP APPLICATION SOFTWARE 5 (last visited Mar. 10, 2011), available at
http://download.microsoft.com/download/1/6/6/16630C2A-E42E-4A07-BB921DB5563634D9/Microsoft%20Office%202010%20pdf/clientallup_eula_english
.pdf.
27
See id. (allowing for automatic updates).
28
Id. at 8–9.
29
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2006).
30
O’Rourke, supra note 22, at 490–492.
31
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
32
For a paper that addresses the role of preemption in overriding license terms
that prohibit fair use, see generally O’Rourke, supra note 22.
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defense claims of copyright misuse, the unconscionability doctrine, and fair
use.33
The copyright misuse claim prohibits companies from leveraging
copyright power to create a monopoly in another market.34 Unfortunately,
this defense’s prevention of copyright enforcement of license terms is
limited. Copyright misuse is rooted in antitrust principles35 and simply
would not apply to the large number of cases where rightsholders try to use
copyright to enforce license terms that are not anti-competitive.
Furthermore, even in the antitrust context, the counterclaim of copyright
misuse is “weakened by the controversies and lack of doctrinal cohesion
that plague antitrust laws in general,”36 and is “more difficult to apply than
the doctrine of preemption.”37 Although misuse is a potentially powerful
tool, it has limited applicability in most circumstances.
¶18

Under the doctrine of unconscionability, a court may void a
contract if it is “unfair or oppressive because of procedural abuses during
contract formation or because of overreaching contractual terms,
esp[ecially] terms that are unreasonably favorable to one party while
precluding meaningful choice for the other party.”38 Although this doctrine
“has proved its worth as a roving consumer protection measure, [] it has
yielded less satisfactory and more controversial results in other settings,
especially . . . transactions between merchants.”39 Unconscionability is also
a state doctrine, which means that the enforceability of a particular contract
may vary from state to state. Egregiously unfair contracts can be struck
down, but the limited use of the doctrine in most cases and state-to-state
variance limit this remedy’s ability to deal with the more general problem of
copyright enforcement of license terms.
¶19

33

Preemption was another potentially powerful defense, especially in fair
use/reverse engineering cases, but “most courts and many commentators have
rejected preemption as the appropriate doctrinal tool for addressing challenges to
these provisions.” Viva R. Moffat, Super-Copyright: Contracts, Preemption,
and the Structure of Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 45, 45
(2007). Further analysis of the preemption issue is beyond the scope of this
paper.
34
Jennifer R. Knight, Copyright Misuse v. Freedom Of Contract: And The
Winner Is, 73 TENN. L. REV. 237, 240 (2006).
35
J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual
Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom Of Contract With Public Good Uses Of
Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 922 (1999).
36
Id. at 924. One of these problems is the current circuit split over whether
copyright misuse itself is a valid defense. Knight, supra note 34, at 266.
37
Reichman & Franklin, supra note 35, at 922–23.
38
Unconscionability Definition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
39
Reichman & Franklin, supra note 35, at 927–28.
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Fair use, the “duct tape of the copyright system,”40 is an expensive
affirmative defense41 that excuses copyright infringement in certain public
interest cases.42 It is difficult to determine, without specific facts, whether a
fair use defense will succeed, and the licensees in these cases face uphill
battles—they agree to license terms and subsequently argue that it is fair use
to violate. This stance, coupled with the expense of the defense, would
probably limit fair use defenses to a handful of cases clustered around
certain public policy interests like promoting reverse engineering.43
¶20

E. Future Problems with Licenses
Products like garage openers44 and printers,45 into which software
has been incorporated, are universally available and could easily be subject
to licensing issues. If noninfringing use of the software hinged on a license,
and use of the physical product required use of the software, then failure to
abide by the license at some point in the product’s life cycle (for example,
when one purchases a generic replacement part) could make the use of the
product an infringement of copyright. This result seems ridiculous, but the
scenario is only one step away from the current suits where rightsholders try
to enforce license terms through copyright.
¶21

II. CIRCUIT SPLIT: SENSIBLE OWNERS AND A NEXUS TO COPYRIGHT
Circuit courts have developed new legal theories to stop licensors
from using copyright to enforce non-copyright terms.
¶22

One of the first cases to address this issue was Krause v. Titleserv,
Inc.46 Krause, the author of several computer programs, got into a dispute
with his employer, Titleserv, and forbade it from modifying the source code
of his programs, effectively making the programs useless.47 Titleserv
¶23

40

JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE
MIND 120 (2008).
41
Fred H. Cate, The Technological Transformation of Copyright Law, 81 IOWA
L. REV. 1395, 1457–58 (1996).
42
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
43
See, e.g., Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992)
(arguing that reverse engineering for the purpose of compatibility served the
goals “the Copyright Act was intended to promote”).
44
E.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
45
E.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522
(6th Cir. 2004).
46
Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2005).
47
See id. at 121 (“Inability to modify the source code would have severely
limited the value of those programs to Titleserv. Many routine functions, such
as the addition of a new customer or a change of a customer address, could be
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modified the source code anyway, and Krause sued for copyright
infringement because copies and derivative works were created in this
process.48 Titleserv argued that its actions were allowed under 17 U.S.C. §
117, and that it owned the copies of the programs it had modified because it
paid Krause a considerable sum to develop them and had an undisputed
right to use them indefinitely.49
The Second Circuit resolved this dispute by clarifying the definition
of “owner” in § 117(a).50 The court noted that the original drafted language
for § 117(a)—“rightful possessor”—was incredibly broad, and suggested
that Congress’s shift to “owner” was an attempt to rein in, but not
completely restrict, the application of this clause.51 Furthermore, the
question of whether formal title was granted would typically be a state law
issue, and it would undermine the uniformity of copyright to construe §
117(a) as hinging on state law.52 Finally,
¶24

it seems anomalous for a user whose degree of ownership of a copy is
so complete that he may lawfully use it and keep it forever, or if so
disposed, throw it in the trash, to be nonetheless unauthorized to fix it
when it develops a bug, or to make an archival copy as backup
security.53

For these reasons, the court held that § 117(a) ownership should
hinge on “whether the party exercises sufficient incidents of ownership over
a copy of the program to be sensibly considered the owner of the copy for
purposes of § 117(a).”54 Here, “Titleserv’s right, for which it paid
substantial sums, to possess and use a copy indefinitely without material
restriction, as well as to discard or destroy it at will, gave it sufficient
incidents of ownership to make it the owner of the copy for purposes of
applying § 117(a).”55 Even though it had licensed the software from its
¶25

performed only by changing the source code. In addition, changes were
required to fix bugs from time to time to keep the system from crashing.”).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 122.
50
Id. at 121–122.
51
Id. at 122–123.
52
Id. at 123.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 124.
55
Id. at 124–25. In its opinion, the court “considered” a few additional factors:
“Titleserv paid Krause substantial consideration to develop the programs for its
sole benefit. Krause customized the software to serve Titleserv’s operations.
The copies were stored on a server owned by Titleserv. Krause never reserved
the right to repossess the copies . . . .” Id. at 124.
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employee, as an owner under § 117(a), Titleserv could not be liable in
copyright for violating non-copyright license terms.56
The Ninth Circuit has taken a different approach. In MDY v.
Blizzard,57 MDY argued, like Titleserv, that the licensor’s use of the game
was protected by § 117.58 This assertion was not accepted by the court,
however, because the defense was effectively eliminated in an earlier Ninth
Circuit case, Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.59 There, the court held that a software
transfer is a license, rather than a sale, when the license “(1) specifies that
the user is granted a license; (2) significantly restricts the user’s ability to
transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions.”60
¶26

Here, Blizzard specified that the user is granted a license, required
transferees to transfer all original documentation and accept Blizzard’s
license (transfer restrictions), and reserved the right terminate service if a
player violated the terms of use (use restrictions).61 As such, Blizzard’s
transfers were licenses, and § 117(a) did not apply.62
¶27

Determining whether users are owners did not end the inquiry into
whether there was direct infringement. The court noted63 that “[t]o recover
for copyright infringement based on breach of a license agreement, (1) the
copying must exceed the scope of the defendant’s license and (2) the
copyright owner’s complaint must be grounded in an exclusive right of
copyright (e.g., unlawful reproduction or distribution).”64 To prevent
¶28

56

17 U.S.C. § 117(a). The court subsumed the unauthorized copies analysis into
unauthorized modification analysis, and the rest of the opinion is devoted to
whether Titleserv’s modifications fell under § 117(a). Titleserv, 402 F.3d at
125–130.
57
MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010).
58
Id. at 937.
59
Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
60
Id. at 1111.
61
MDY Indus., LLC, 629 F.3d at 938–39.
62
Id. at 939.
63
It is unclear whether this language—or the language that follows—is dicta.
Immediately prior to this analysis, the court held that Blizzard’s “prohibitions
against bots and unauthorized third-party software are covenants rather than
copyright-enforceable conditions.” Id. at 939–40. As covenants, their breach
“is actionable only under contract law.” Id. at 939. It is hard to see how this
does not definitively resolve the issue. Furthermore, later in the opinion, the
court treats the contract/covenant analysis as dispositive: “We have explained
that [Blizzard’s] bot prohibition is a license covenant rather than a condition.
Thus, a Glider user who violates this covenant does not infringe by continuing to
copy code into RAM.” Id. at 954. As such, the court’s “nexus of copyright”
language is probably technically dicta, but, given the amount of time the court
spent on the issue, extremely persuasive.
64
Id. at 940. This is also the view espoused by Nimmer:
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copyright holders from using copyright law to enforce their license terms,
the court went one step further:65 “for a licensee’s violation of a contract to
constitute copyright infringement, there must be a nexus between the
[contract] condition and the licensor’s exclusive rights of copyright.”66
Here, the license provision that WoW players had violated was one
that prohibited cheating through unrelated add-on software. The activity
Blizzard was trying to regulate through this clause did not affect any of
Blizzard’s copyrights under § 106, so the violation of the clause could not
be enforced through copyright.67 As a result, there was no copyright
infringement, and MDY was not secondarily liable.68
¶29

If the grantee’s violation consists of a failure to satisfy a condition to the
grant (as distinguished from a breach of a covenant), it follows that the
rights dependent on satisfaction of that condition have not been effectively
granted, rendering any use by the grantee without authority from the
grantor. The legal consequence is that the grantee’s conduct10 may
constitute copyright infringement.
3-10 MELVIN B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§10.15[A][2] (2010). Furthermore, “[t]o be actionable as infringement, the
conduct must implicate one of the copyright owner’s enumerated rights.” Id. at
n.10.
65
MDYIndus., LLC, 629 F.3d at 941 (“Were we to hold otherwise, Blizzard—or
any software copyright holder—could designate any disfavored conduct during
software use as copyright infringement, by purporting to condition the license on
the player’s abstention from the disfavored conduct. The rationale would be that
because the conduct occurs while the player’s computer is copying the software
code into RAM in order for it to run, the violation is copyright infringement.
This would allow software copyright owners far greater rights than Congress has
generally conferred on copyright owners.”).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 941.
68
Id. The Federal Circuit, the only other circuit to explicitly address this issue,
has taken a slightly different approach. Dealing first with the question of
whether a licensee can use 17 U.S.C. § 117(a), the Federal Circuit held that a
transfer was a license if it “imposed more severe restrictions on [the licensee’s]
rights . . . than would be imposed on a party who owned copies of the software
subject only to the rights of the copyright holder under the Copyright Act.”
DSC Commc’n Corp. v. Pulse Commc’n, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
1999). As a result, a license that prohibited transfer and restricted the buyer
from using the software on third-party hardware constituted a license, not a sale.
Id. at 1360–63. However, like the Ninth Circuit, the Federal Circuit then turns to
the two-step analysis of whether the defendant’s actions were both 1) outside the
scope of the license and 2) within copyright. Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom
Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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III. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO APPROACHES
Although both the Ninth and Second Circuits prevented content
creators from enforcing their licenses through copyright, they chose
different approaches. The Ninth Circuit’s approach is better supported by
the legislature, clearer, and better able to stop future content creators from
using copyright to enforce their licenses.
¶30

A. Legislative Support
The statutory language and legislative history of 17 U.S.C. § 117
strongly support the Ninth Circuit’s approach. A buyer qualifies as an
owner for the purposes of § 117(a) under very limited circumstances: when
he has been granted title, or when his use or transfer of the copy is
unrestricted.69 Conversely, the Second Circuit considers almost every
licensee an owner. Although the court purports to limit owners under §
117(a) to those with the right to possess and use their software “without
material restriction,”70 a closer examination reveals that this condition has
little practical effect. In Titleserv, the licensee was prohibited from
modifying the software’s source code, which, in the court’s own language,
“would have severely limited the value of those programs . . . .”71 If a
limitation that prevents the licensee from doing basic, essential tasks (such
as adding customers) in his program is not a material restriction, it is
unclear if anything qualifies as such.72 As a result, a buyer is an owner for
the purposes of § 117(a) when he pays for the software and has the right to
possess and use copies of the programs forever or destroy them at will.73
¶31

The statutory language better supports the Ninth Circuit’s approach.
Section 117(a) protects “owners,” not “licensees.” The Second Circuit’s
expansive definition of “owner” practically eliminates the distinction
between the two. Furthermore, Congress’s use of both “owner”74 and
“lessee”75 in the copyright statute demonstrates that it was quite capable of
making this distinction if it wanted to do so. The Second Circuit’s
expansive definition of “owner” appears to be unjustified.
¶32

69

Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).
Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2005).
71
Id. at 121.
72
Id. at 124–25.
73
Id.
74
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (“[I]t is not an infringement for the owner of a
copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or
adaptation of that computer program . . . .” (emphasis added)).
75
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (“[I]t is not an infringement for the owner or
lessee of a machine to make or authorize the making of a copy of a computer
program . . . .” (emphasis added)).
70
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The Second Circuit’s approach is further discredited by legislative
history. One point is clear: The National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) drafted § 117(a) to
protect “rightful possessors.”76 Without comment, Congress adopted almost
all of CONTU’s suggested language—but changed “rightful possessors” to
“owners.”77 Some commentators have suggested that this change was a
typo,78 while the Second Circuit has argued that Congress merely wanted
more restrictive language that would prevent “a messenger delivering a
program, a bailee, or countless others temporarily in lawful possession of a
copy” from taking advantage of § 117(a).79
¶33

It is likely that Congress did not want § 117(a)80 to be available to
all rightful possessors, and there is no evidence that it wanted to adopt the
Second Circuit’s approach and open § 117(a) to the largest category of
software users—licensees. Software licenses were common when the law
was revised,81 and if Congress intended to limit § 117(a)’s reach yet still
allow licensees to use it, it seems much more likely that Congress would
have used the phrase “owners or lessee”82 as it did in § 117(c). This choice
is especially significant because § 117(c) was adopted after § 117(a), and
also after the MAI case that created this potential problem.83 The fact that
Congress could have but did not mention lessees, and instead focused on
owners, strongly supports the Ninth Circuit’s approach.
¶34

76

DSC Commc’n Corp. v. Pulse Commc’n, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
77
Id.
78
Katrine Levin, Intellectual Property Law: Mai v. Peak: Should Loading
Operating System Software Into RAM Constitute Copyright Infringement?, 24
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 649, 676 (1994).
79
Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2005).
80
17 U.S.C. § 117(a). The statute reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 [17 USCS § 106], it is not
an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make
or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer
program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and
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B. Certainty and Ambiguity
The Ninth Circuit’s approach provides more certainty than that of
the Second Circuit with regard to determining whether a license term can be
enforced through copyright. Under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, a license
term will be enforced through copyright if the software transfer is a license,
rather than a sale, and if there is a nexus between the license term regulating
an activity and copyright.84
¶35

It is important to note that the first inquiry (whether there is a
license or a sale) is irrelevant. If the transfer is a sale, the buyer can only be
sued under copyright for acts that violate the rightsholder’s copyright, such
as permanent copying or derivative works. If the transfer is a license, the
licensee can only be sued under copyright for violating license terms that
protect the rightsholder’s copyrights, such as a prohibition on creating
permanent copies or derivative works. Thus, a court adhering to the Ninth
Circuit’s approach need only ask whether there is a nexus between the term
and the content creator’s copyright. This is a relatively straightforward
inquiry that leaves little room for ambiguity. It is, therefore, easy under the
Ninth Circuit’s doctrine for rightsholders and consumers to determine
whether a license term can be enforced through copyright.
¶36

The Second Circuit’s test, on the other hand, is weighed down by
ambiguous language and an uncertain standard. Titleserv proposed that a
transferee does not violate copyright for transitory copies of software
programs, even if they are created without the copyright holder’s
permission, if the transferee “exercises sufficient incidents of ownership
over a copy of the program to be sensibly considered the owner.”85 This
language, especially the words “sufficient” and “sensibly considered”
provides little guidance to rightsholders and consumers to determine
whether a particular license can be enforced through copyright.
¶37

Furthermore, the Second Circuit’s elaboration of this test provides
little clarification. In Titleserv, the court initially “considers” a wide variety
of factors in determining whether the defendants were sensibly considered
owners—some of which would be fairly restrictive (such as Titleserv’s
substantial expenditures to develop the software in question).86 The court’s
final holding, however, seems to encompass a much broader set of
circumstances (paying for the right to “use and possess” the software).87 As
a result, it is unclear whether subsequent cases will adopt Titleserv’s broad
or narrow interpretation, creating further ambiguity around the question of
¶38
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when license terms can be enforced through copyright in the Second
Circuit.

C. Solving the Problem: Preventing Copyright Holders From
Enforcing Contract Terms Through Copyright
Although there is little difference between the two Circuits in their
ability to prevent copyright holders from enforcing contract terms through
copyright, the Ninth Circuit’s approach is still preferable because it is more
difficult to circumvent.
¶39

In the Second Circuit, most license holders will probably be
considered owners for the purposes of § 117(a).88 As a result, they cannot
be held liable in copyright for the temporary copies their software produce
incidental to running. They can, however, be held liable for any other
copyright-significant act—the creation of permanent copies or derivative
works.
¶40

In the Ninth Circuit, most software transferees will probably be
considered licensees, not owners. These licensees, however, can only be
sued in copyright for violating a license term that is tied to a copyright, such
as the creation of permanent copies or derivative works. They cannot be
sued in copyright just for the temporary copies their software produce
incidental to running, even if they lack the copyright holder’s permission.
Under both Circuits’ approaches, then, license terms that do not protect a
copyright cannot be enforced through copyright—in the Second Circuit,
because licensees are considered owners, and in the Ninth Circuit, through
judicial rulemaking.
¶41

While these results are similar, there remains one crucial difference
between the two approaches: the Second Circuit’s test is far easier to
circumvent. The Ninth Circuit, in MDY, has explicitly created a rule against
rightsholders using copyright to enforce non-copyright terms,89 and has
based this rule in unequivocal policy arguments that copyright should not be
expanded by contract.90 Even if a rightsholder were somehow able to
circumvent the exact language of MDY, a future court would be guided by
MDY’s policy rationale to prevent that rightsholder from enforcing a
contract term through copyright. Titleserv has no such explanation, and the
test that it uses—“sufficient incidents of ownership” to “be sensibly
considered the owner”91 of a software copy—is based on technicalities that
could be easily circumvented by an entrepreneurial rightsholder who adds
the requirement that the software be returned after use.
¶42
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CONCLUSION
As software and the practice of software licensing continue to
develop, courts will have to formulate new rules to prevent rightsholders
from enforcing their contracts through copyright. Two courts, the Ninth
Circuit and the Second Circuit, have both faced this problem head on, and
each has developed its own response. These two responses, however, are
not equal. The Second Circuit tries to sidestep the heart of the issue by
adhering to a technical definition of “owner,” and in doing so, creates a rule
that is unsupported by the legislature, ambiguous, and easy to circumvent.
The Ninth Circuit directly faces the question of when to enforce license
terms through copyright by using a new rule that is easy to apply and
difficult to avoid. Going forward, it is important for courts to understand
the approaches taken by these circuit courts and the merits of each, and
ultimately to better develop their own responses to rightsholders that try to
enforce their license terms through copyright.
¶43

